Fails-to-deliver, short selling, and market quality by Fotak, Veljko et al.
 http://go.warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Fotak, Veljko , Raman, Vikas and Yadav, Pradeep K. (2012) Fails-to-deliver, short 
selling, and market quality. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Coventry, UK. 
(Unpublished) 
 
Permanent WRAP url: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/55474   
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-
profit purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and 
full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original 
metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here is a working paper or pre-print that may be later published 
elsewhere.  If a published version is known of, the above WRAP url will contain details 
on finding it. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
Fails-to-Deliver, Short Selling, and Market Quality 
  
Veljko Fotak 
Vikas Raman 
Pradeep K. Yadav
*
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
We investigate the collective net impact on market liquidity and pricing efficiency of equity trades that result in 
fails to deliver (“FTDs”). Given the nature of the US electronic trade settlement system for stocks, such “FTD 
trades” should originate almost exclusively from short sales, and we confirm this empirically on the basis of a 
natural experiment arising from a regulatory event. For a sample of 1,492 NYSE common stocks over a 42-
month period from 2005 to 2008, we find that such trades lead to the same beneficial impact on liquidity and 
pricing efficiency as short sales that result in timely delivery. We do not find evidence that such trades are 
causally related to subsequent price declines or distortions, or to the failure of financial firms during the 2008 
financial crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
Trades in US stock markets are settled on a three-day cycle: for trades on day t, if the net delivery 
obligations of a clearing member are not fulfilled on day t+3, any undelivered position becomes a “failure-to-
deliver” (or “FTD”).1 The total number of FTDs for a stock on any day is, by definition, the open interest of 
these undelivered positions. This paper investigates the collective net impact of equity trades that result in 
FTDs. We hereafter label such trades as “FTD trades”. First, we analyze the effect of FTD trades on pricing 
efficiency and liquidity. Second, we examine whether FTD trades played a causal role in the major price 
declines or the demise of financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis.  
FTDs originate almost exclusively from short sales. Ownership records are ordinarily held, tracked and 
transferred electronically through an automated process; and if the stock ownership accounts associated with a 
seller with a net delivery obligation do not actually include the stock needed for delivery on the third day 
following a trade, the undelivered position becomes a FTD. The automated nature of the electronic process 
ensures that “long” sales (i.e. sales backed up by duly owned stock in relevant stock ownership accounts) do not 
remain undelivered; hence, the delivery shortfall in stock ownership accounts arises when the seller does not 
own the stock (i.e., the trade is a short sale) and the corresponding stock has not been borrowed in time to credit 
the stock ownership account by settlement day. Furthermore, the three-day settlement cycle starts only after 
trade reconciliation between buyer and seller firms for removal of purely clerical or recording errors; and hence 
such errors (in “long” sales) cannot be responsible for FTDs. However, processing delays with respect to share 
certificates not held electronically can occasionally cause FTDs to arise also from “long” sales (e.g., when the 
broker does not insist on delivery and electronic recording of any paper certificates prior to trade); but such 
cases should be a minuscule proportion of the total number of FTDs, since more than 99.9% of all trades 
involve only electronically held securities (Morris and Goldstein, 2009).
2
 Therefore, the open interest of 
undelivered positions (i.e., the total number of FTDs) should be virtually the same as the open interest of 
undelivered short sold positions. This is empirically confirmed by results we document at the outset, based on a 
natural experiment arising from an exogenous regulatory event. 
                                                 
1
 Settlement is done electronically through the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation and its subsidiaries (hereafter 
collectively referred to as “DTCC”). DTCC becomes the central counterparty of all duly matched trades, electronically 
checks stock ownership accounts associated with all such trades, and notifies clearing brokers about their settlement day 
net delivery obligations. 
2
 Morris and Goldstein (2009) is a publication officially endorsed by DTCC to provide details of the settlement system. 
The institutional conclusions here are also confirmed by our discussions with industry insiders.  
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The investigation of FTD trades is interesting from an economic perspective, since a short sale that fails 
to deliver should be associated with the same market impact as a short sale that results in timely delivery; 
hence, it should arguably have a positive impact on liquidity and pricing efficiency, as is well-documented of 
short selling in general.
3
 First, the two might not differ at inception, as a short seller need not definitively know 
on the day t of the trade whether or not s/he will deliver or fail on settlement day t+3. This is because that 
decision should rationally be taken only on day t+3 and on the basis of the rebate rates in the OTC stock-
borrowing market on day t+3.
 4
 The short seller will borrow and deliver if these rebate rates are positive and fail 
if they are negative.
5
 Second, as explained by Culp and Heaton (2008), an FTD results either in an automatic 
stock borrowing at zero rebate rates from a pool of voluntary lenders under the DTCC Stock Borrow Program, 
or a forced stock borrowing at zero rebate rates from a (randomly assigned and daily changing) broker with a 
long stock position.
6
 As far as the market is concerned, since the stock is being temporarily borrowed anyway 
(voluntarily or otherwise), there should not be any functional consequences arising from whether a short sale 
ultimately results in an FTD or not.
7
 In this context, we empirically analyze the impact on pricing efficiency and 
liquidity of short sales that fail to deliver, questioning whether that impact is any different from the impact of 
timely-delivered short sales. 
Our investigation of FTD trades is also motivated by the enormous regulatory focus on reducing such 
trades.
8
 Regulatory concerns have been driven by the widespread perception and the extensive litigation about 
at least a subset of FTD trades being used abusively or manipulatively by “naked” short sellers strategically 
choosing whether or not to deliver.
9
 Such “naked” short sellers have also been widely alleged to have 
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 While there could be dissenting opinions, there is broad consensus behind an extensive literature finding that short selling 
is beneficial for pricing efficiency and liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002 and 2003; 
Miller,1977; Bris et. al.,2007; Diether et al.,2009; Boehmer et al.,  2008). 
4
 Clearly, since stock borrowing arrangements are ordinarily accompanied by same day delivery, it is economically not 
rational for short sellers to borrow prior to the delivery date and pay the extra borrowing fees involved (Geczy et al., 2002). 
5
 Evans, et al. (2009) show that short sellers use the alternative to fail only when rebate rates are negative. Boni (2006) also 
offers evidence of correlation between fails and borrowing costs, which she interprets as indicative of “strategic” fails. 
6
 The involuntary lender can enforce delivery by forcing a “buy-in” from the market, but there is little incentive to do this 
since the random assignment can potentially change every day (Putniņš, 2010).   
7
 The majority of delivery ‘fails’ are just delays in delivery: Boni (2006) shows that the median age of fails is only 3 days. 
8
 In January 2005, Regulation SHO introduced requirements to “locate” stocks prior to a short sale and to “close-out” 
FTDs for “threshold-list” stocks with high number of persistent FTDs; but the locate requirement did not eliminate FTDs 
since rules allowed use of “Easy to Borrow” lists without locating a specific bloc of shares (Welborn, 2008). In July/ 
August 2008, a temporary SEC Order mandated specific stock borrowing arrangements prior to short selling in select 
financial stocks. In September 2008, following Lehman’s collapse, FTDs were banned (except for market-makers) by 
mandating a presumption of deceptive intent from a FTD, and by requiring a compulsory "close-out" of a FTD through 
borrowing or purchase by the broker by the morning after the failure day (through Rule 204T, later made permanent). In 
November 2012, new EU rules have instituted a pan-European pre-trade borrowing requirement for short sales.  
9
 There is no widely accepted definition of the term “naked short selling”. The SEC’s use of the term appears to be 
confined to just implying failing-to-deliver because of not making pre-trade borrowing arrangements. However, the term is 
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contributed to the financial crisis by precipitating sharp price declines of financial firms.
10
 Notwithstanding 
extensive concerns, the SEC (in Report 450, March 2009) says that "there is hardly unanimity in the investment 
community or the financial media” on associated dangers, and “despite its assertions regarding the potential of 
danger..., the [SEC] Report can cite to no bona fide studies” on the market impact associated with FTD trades. 
This paper accordingly investigates FTD trades. 
We first empirically confirm whether FTD trades arise primarily from short sales. We utilize a natural 
experiment based on an exogenously-imposed temporary SEC Emergency Order (Release 58166 dated July 15, 
2008) that remained in force between July 21 and August 12, 2008. The only mandate of this order was to 
require pre-borrowing arrangements prior to all short sales in 19 selected financial stocks in order to eliminate 
new FTDs. This order could not affect any FTDs arising from (processing delays in) “long” sales, since the 
order was only about stock-borrowing for short sales. We find that, during the temporary order validity period, 
reported FTDs for the affected securities reduce rapidly to only about 12% of their pre-order average within one 
week, to just about 2% of their pre-order average within three weeks, and finally, on the last day of the order 
period, reported FTDs are zero for each and every affected security. In contrast, we observe a slight increase in 
FTDs for control-sample securities. Given that FTDs cannot fall immediately to zero because of FTDs 
persisting from prior to the order, this natural experiment provides strong evidence, consistent with our 
understanding of settlement mechanics, that FTD trades arise overwhelmingly from short sales. 
Our main sample consists of all the 1,492 NYSE ordinary common-share issues for which all relevant 
data is available over the period January 2005 to June 2008. For robustness, we replicate our analysis on a 
sample of 2,381 NASDAQ ordinary common-share issues over the same period. The first section of the 
empirical analysis examines whether FTD trades are followed by reductions in pricing errors, pricing error 
volatility, return volatility, bid-ask spreads, and order imbalances. The various tests we present allow us to 
control for timely-delivered short sales and to compare the impact of FTD trades and timely-delivered short 
sales. First, we analyze liquidity and pricing efficiency for securities in different portfolios based on the number 
                                                                                                                                                                      
often inextricably linked to a pejorative mental presumption of manipulative intent, which we do not examine in this paper. 
This is a paper on the totality of FTD trades irrespective of any manipulative intent. It is not possible to determine 
manipulative intent with any reasonable objectivity with the data available to us. Furthermore, in spite of a flood of 
lawsuits, even after intensive individual case analysis within the courts’ system, it has not been possible to prove 
manipulative intent to the extent necessary to win a judgment of damages relating to “naked” short selling (Stokes, 2009). 
10
 Several investor associations and high-profile CEOs lobbied aggressively against FTDs, and the huge volume of 
litigation alleging associated stock price manipulation led to “naked” short selling being called the “Holy Grail ….bigger 
than tobacco” for plaintiffs’ lawyers (Stokes, 2009). Over a two-year period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, the 
SEC received more than 5,000 complaints in this regard (Wall Street Journal Asia, March 20, 2009), and a Factiva search 
shows over 4,600 printed English-language articles on the subject. 
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of FTDs. Second, we utilize OLS regressions and Granger-causality tests to investigate the link between FTD 
trades and market liquidity and pricing efficiency. Third, given the complex and endogenous interrelationships 
between market quality metrics, we fit vector autoregressive models and test the same relationships using 
impulse response functions. To further fully distinguish between association and causality, we utilize the 
imposition of the July/August 2008 SEC Emergency Order selectively targeting only FTD trades and estimate 
the impact of that order on pricing efficiency and liquidity. Finally, we examine whether FTD trades by market 
makers affect securities differently from FTD trades by other “public traders”, by using a proxy based on the 
reduction in FTDs subsequent to SEC Rule 204T in September 2008 that selectively precluded public-trader 
FTDs but not market-maker FTDs.  
The second section of the empirical analysis investigates whether FTD trades causally precipitated price 
declines of financial firms during the 2008 financial crisis. In this context, we analyze FTDs of a few high-
profile financial firms that experienced dramatic stock price declines: Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (“Bear 
Stearns”), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman”), Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (“Merrill”), and American 
Insurance Group (“AIG”). We also analyze credit rating downgrades and large price drops during 2008 to 
examine if short sales that fail to deliver trigger price declines, or are responding to them and associated news.  
We find that FTDs affect about 95% of NYSE securities, though on average only about 1% of short 
sales result in delivery failures. FTD data are reported daily: hence, all our analysis is at daily frequency. We 
estimate that FTD trades equivalent to 10 basis points of the number of outstanding shares lead to a 1% 
reduction in spreads, a 2% reduction in order imbalances, a 10% reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing 
errors, a 13% decline in pricing error volatility, and a 1% reduction in stock price volatility; each of these 
changes is statistically significant and not subject to significant subsequent corrections. These results are 
consistent with failing-to-deliver short sellers acting as value arbitrageurs enhancing pricing efficiency and 
providing liquidity as needed. Consistent with our hypotheses, we also find that the estimated impact of FTD 
trades and delivered short sales on our market-quality metrics is similar in both magnitude and significance. We 
further focus on sub-samples of securities affected by high levels of FTDs or by persistent FTDs and obtain 
very similar results.
11
 Importantly, to control for any omitted variables, we investigate the securities affected by 
                                                 
11
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry. Accordingly, we identify two data subsets. First, we 
isolate a sub-sample of securities with the highest average level of outstanding FTDs. Second, we isolate securities which 
are included, at any time between January 2005 and July 2008, in the “Threshold List” – a list published by the SEC 
identifying securities with high and persistent levels of outstanding FTDs. 
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the exogenous imposition of the July/August 2008 SEC Emergency Order mandating stock borrowing prior to a 
short sale and find that these securities display a significant increase in returns volatility, pricing error volatility, 
and spreads during the time period for which the order was in force: i.e., the pre-short sale stock-borrowing 
mandate designed to reduce FTDs significantly worsened pricing efficiency and liquidity. Finally, our results 
show that the beneficial impact on pricing efficiency and liquidity of FTD trades is driven by both market-
maker FTDs and FTDs originating from public traders. Overall, we conclude that short sales that fail to deliver 
contribute beneficially to market liquidity and pricing efficiency, just as duly delivered short sales do.  
In relation to Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill and AIG, we find that FTDs were too few for any 
significant stock price distortions for most of the days, and when FTDs did become abnormally high, it was 
after price declines, not before. Similarly, we find that the volume of FTDs increases after credit rating 
downgrade announcements and after large price drops, not before. In each case, failing-to-deliver short sellers 
were responding to information about the firms, rather than being responsible for triggering observed price 
declines. We find no evidence that FTDs played a causal role in the demise of financial institutions or in 
generating price distortions during the 2008 financial crisis. 
This research contributes to the literature on settlement systems and delivery failures. While it is true 
that concerns about delivery fails are justified in the context of fair and orderly markets, it is also true that 
Evans, et al. (2009) show that “the alternative to fail is valuable and important to the pricing and trading of 
options”; and our results additionally and importantly show that the alternative to fail has a beneficial impact on 
liquidity and pricing efficiency of equity markets as well. We also know from Merrick, et al. (2005) that the 
alternative to fail is an important release valve for settlement-related pressures and manipulative distortions. 
Similarly, in the context of our research, the alternative to fail is an important release valve that protects traders 
from the extreme vagaries of the less regulated stock borrowing market: it is particularly valuable when stock-
borrowing become so costly that short-selling rebate rates become negative, which is exactly when liquidity is 
most needed in the stock-borrowing market (Evans, et al., 2009). Hence, regulatory removal of the alternative to 
fail for all public traders is debatable when progressive fines for settlement delays can be effective without 
being an extreme solution. It is more important for regulators to focus on removing the economic incentives for 
delivery failures by improving the liquidity, transparency and regulation of the stock borrowing market.  
This research also contributes significantly to the short selling literature. First, while there is extensive 
evidence on the market-quality benefits of short selling, our contribution is to show that short sales that fail to 
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deliver are as beneficial for market quality as short sales that deliver in time. Second, our evidence shows that a 
blanket ban on FTDs in some stocks in July 2008, effectively an additional constraint on short selling, has 
predictably negative consequences on market quality; and we thereby extend the literature on the market impact 
of short sales restrictions.
12
 Finally, our findings have important implications for the extensive media 
discussions on, and the regulatory response to, “naked” short sales. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the link between FTDs and 
short sales, and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the data, the variables and the measures 
utilized. Section 4 presents empirical results on the impact of FTD trades on pricing efficiency and liquidity. 
Section 5 investigates the role of FTD trades in creating price distortions during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. FTDs, short sales and testable hypotheses  
2.1.       FTDs and short sales 
As discussed in the introduction, the total number of FTDs (i.e., the open interest of undelivered 
positions) should ordinarily be the same as the open interest of undelivered short sold positions, though 
processing delays with respect to paper certificates can sometimes cause FTDs to arise also from “long” sales.13 
In this sub-section, we empirically examine whether FTDs arise overwhelmingly from short sales (rather than 
“long” sales) using a natural experiment arising from the exogenous imposition by the SEC of an Emergency 
Order on July 15, 2008, selectively targeting pre-short sale borrowing requirements and applicable only to the 
stocks of a select group of 19 publicly traded financial institutions from July 21 to August 12, 2008.  
The SEC order required that “no person may effect a short sale in these securities… unless such person 
or its agent has borrowed or arranged to borrow the security or otherwise has the security available to borrow 
in its inventory prior to effecting such short sale.” (SEC Release 58166, 2008). The only regulatory change 
affecting these stocks during this period was this temporary order mandating firm stock-borrowing 
                                                 
12
 Several recent papers examine short selling restrictions in 2008: Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) and Kolasinsky, et al. 
(2012) also examine aspects of the July/August 2008 SEC Emergency Order that we investigate in this paper; while other 
papers - Battalio and Schultz  (2011), Boehmer, et al. (2011), Autore, et al. (2011) and Beber and Pagano (2011) - examine 
the subsequent September 2008 short selling ban (that we do not examine).  
13
 FTDs can potentially arise from the mechanism of the offering process in price-supported IPOs (Edwards and Hanley, 
2010). In this context, as indicated later in Section 3, we remove from our sample: first, all ETFs and other non-common-
stock securities; second, securities that started trading during our sample interval (to avoid distorting our inferences 
through IPO-related FTDs); and third, securities for which we observe significant changes in the number of shares 
outstanding (to prevent the possibility of similar FTDs in conjunction with other share issues). 
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arrangements prior to executing short sales. Any FTDs arising from “long” sales cannot be affected by this 
order, as “long” sales do not require any stock borrowing: the effect of the SEC order on FTDs can arise only 
from short sales. We employ an event study methodology to investigate the variation in FTDs around this 
mandate requiring pre-short sale stock borrowing arrangements. 
 Data on FTDs have been made available by the SEC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
since March 22, 2004.
14
 Data for 17 of the 19 securities affected by the July 2008 SEC Emergency Order are 
available from CRSP. We construct a matched control sample: for each of our affected 17 affected securities, 
we identify the firm that is not affected by the SEC Emergency Order, but shares the same 4-digit SIC code and 
has the closest market capitalization as of January 1, 2008. Then, we analyze the number of reported FTDs duly 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding, for both event and control samples, over a pre-ban period (January 
1 to July 20, 2008), for each week in the ban period (July 21
 
to August 12, 2008), and for the three-week period 
following the ban (August 13 to September 2, 2008), finishing well before the tumultuous period around the 
Lehman bankruptcy in mid-September 2008.
15
 We report these results in Table I. 
 Reported FTDs (as a proportion of shares outstanding) for the 17 securities in our sample average 4.88 
basis points (or ‘bp’) during the pre-order period. After the order, FTDs reduce rapidly to about 0.57 bp, or 12% 
of their pre-order average within one week; to about 0.12 bp, or 2% of the pre-order average, within three 
weeks; and, on the last day of the Emergency Order period, reported FTDs are zero for each and every affected 
security. In contrast, reported FTDs for control sample securities do not decrease over the same time frame. As 
soon as the temporary order period expires, reported FTDs of affected securities increase monotonically and 
significantly. The difference in reported FTDs between event and control firms is positive and significant prior 
to the mandate period, negative and significant during the mandate period, and again positive and significant 
after the mandate is lifted. Given that reported FTDs cannot fall immediately to zero because of the time 
required for fails outstanding from prior to the SEC order to clear (Boni, 2006), this “natural experiment” 
strongly indicates that FTDs arise almost entirely from short sales.
16
 
 
                                                 
14
 SEC data record FTDs for a security when only when FTDs exceed 10,000 shares. Since this is a tiny fraction of the total 
number of shares outstanding for most securities, the underestimation due to the threshold is likely to be immaterial. 
15
 Here and in the remainder of the paper, we scale the number of FTDs by the number of shares outstanding, mirroring 
previous literature which relied on measures of ‘relative short interest’ (short interest scaled by the numbers of shares 
outstanding) and which amply discusses the need to ‘standardize’ short interest data; for example, amongst others, 
DeChow et al. (2001), Desai et al. (2002), and Chen and Singal (2003). 
16
 We also find that new FTDs on day t+3 are significantly (p-value<<0.01) and positively related only to  the daily trading 
volume arising from short sales on day t, and not the daily trading volume arising from “long” sales on day t. 
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2.2  FTD trades: testable hypotheses on pricing efficiency and liquidity 
Duly-delivered short sales, as well as short sales that fail to deliver in time, should both contribute 
similarly to the price discovery process by enabling value-traders to more quickly and easily bring the prices of 
overpriced securities in line with their “true value”. Since FTD trades arise primarily from short sales, our first 
hypothesis is H1: FTD trades have a beneficial impact on pricing efficiency. 
To test Hypothesis H1, we empirically investigate several aspects of pricing efficiency:  
1. Short sales that fail-to-deliver, like timely-delivered short sales, should contribute to pricing efficiency 
to the extent that value arbitrageurs enter the market when securities are over-priced and therefore 
reduce the positive pricing errors of these overpriced securities. Accordingly, we test whether FTD 
trades, like delivered short sales, lead to a reduction in positive pricing errors next period. 
2. A reduction in positive pricing errors should make the market informationally more efficient. Such a 
market should display lower dispersion of pricing errors (Hasbrouck, 1993). Hence, we test whether 
FTD trades, like delivered short sales, lead to reduced volatility of pricing errors next period. 
3. Greater pricing efficiency should translate into reduced volatility of stock returns. Hence, we test 
whether FTD trades, like delivered short sales, lead to a reduction in stock return volatility next period. 
4. If short sales that fail-to-deliver also contribute causally to pricing efficiency, an exogenous imposition 
of mandatory pre-short sale borrowing arrangements should lead to reduced pricing efficiency. 
Accordingly, we test whether the July 2008 SEC Emergency Order leads to higher volatility of pricing 
errors, higher spreads, and lower trading volume. 
Financial intermediaries and other liquidity suppliers should provide liquidity more effectively and 
expeditiously in the presence of all short sales, whether delivered in time or not. Failing to deliver also offers an 
alternative to short sellers when rebate rates are negative (Evans, et al., 2009), i.e., when the cost of borrowing 
in the security-lending markets is high, which is more likely when liquidity is most needed. Hence, our second 
hypothesis is H2: FTD trades have a beneficial impact on market liquidity. 
We test hypothesis H2 in two ways. First, we test whether FTD trades, like timely-delivered short sales, 
lead to lower spreads and reduced order imbalances in the next period. Second, if FTD trades contribute 
causally to greater liquidity, the exogenous imposition of mandatory pre-trade borrowing through the July 2008 
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SEC Emergency Order should lead to a reduction in liquidity. Accordingly, we test whether the Emergency 
Order above led to higher spreads and larger order imbalances.  
2.3.       FTD trades: testable hypothesis on price distortions and the 2008 financial crisis 
As discussed in Section 1, extensive concerns have been articulated in the media and by investor groups 
and company CEOs about FTD trades being utilized to trigger sharp declines in stock prices, particularly during 
the 2008 financial crisis.
17
 Accordingly, our third hypothesis is H3: FTD Trades caused price crashes and 
distortions during the 2008 financial crisis. 
We empirically investigate Hypothesis H3 in several different ways.  
1. FTD trades have been often blamed for the price crashes of Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG and Merrill.18 
Accordingly, we test for high levels of FTD trades prior to the large price declines in the stock prices of 
those companies. 
2. Short sellers are often associated with “bear raids” through failing to deliver to trigger downward price 
spirals with the aim of achieving credit downgrades so as to also profit from potentially simultaneous 
positions in the CDS market. In this context, we test whether the volume of FTD trades grow prior to 
credit rating downgrades. In a similar spirit, we investigate whether volumes of FTD trades grow prior 
to large stock price declines, particularly for securities issued by highly levered firms. 
 
3. Data, variables, and measures  
3.1   Data and sample  
Our main sample consists of all NYSE listed common stocks in CRSP share codes 10 and 11 for which 
complete data are available across the various data sources listed above. By restricting analysis to CRSP share 
codes 10 and 11, we specifically exclude ETFs (in case FTDs are caused by delays in the creation of units), and 
                                                 
17
 Such investor associations include The Movement for Market Reform, National Coalition against Naked Short Selling 
and Coalition for the Reform of Regulation SHO. Crusading high-profile CEOs include Patrick Byrne of Overstock.com 
(which filed lawsuits against both naked-short sellers and financial institutions accused by them of facilitating ‘naked-
shorting’), and Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers who, in his October 2008 testimony before the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform, alleged that "naked short selling .... dealt a critical, if not fatal, blow 
to Bear Stearns", and also contributed significantly to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Examples of lawsuits include The 
Biovail lawsuit against Stephen Cohen, Gradient, and others; the Overstock lawsuit against Rocker Partners, Gradient, and 
others; and the The NFI lawsuit against Bank of America (the Specialist) and the Prime Brokers.  
18
 For example, Robert Shapiro, Former Under Secretary of Commerce, was quoted as stating that “Bear Stearns failed 
because it went bankrupt. However, the pace of the collapse of the stock price was clearly accelerated by the enormous 
naked short sale activity”(Euromoney, December 2008). The media sentiment is exemplified by statements such as “when 
Bear and Lehman made their final leap off the cliff of history, both undeniably got a push — especially in the form of a 
flat-out counterfeiting scheme called naked short selling” (Rolling Stone, October 2009). 
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other securities that are not common stocks.
19
 We also restrict the main sample to securities that are listed for at 
least six months (in order to have adequate data to estimate our vector autoregressive models), and that have 
been trading for at least one year prior to the start of our sample period. Having a year of trading data allows us 
to estimate pricing errors as discussed later in this section. We further require that the number of shares 
outstanding does not vary by more than 10% over any single day, thus controlling for the unusual volumes of 
FTDs around primary market transactions documented by Edwards and Hanley (2010).
20
 In view of the 
potentially confounding influence of the July 2008 SEC Emergency Order and the severe restrictions on short 
selling and FTDs subsequently imposed in September and October 2008, we confine our analysis of FTD trades 
to the period up to June 30, 2008. Our main sample thus consists of 1,492 NYSE securities over the period 
January 2005 to June 2008. For robustness tests, we similarly construct a comparable sample of 2,381 
NASDAQ securities for the same sample period. Our short interest data are from www.shortsqueeze.com, and 
short sales data (available from January 2005 onwards) are from the NYSE. We obtain the number of shares 
outstanding from CRSP. Our market quality measures are based on NYSE TAQ data. 
 
3.2  Outstanding Fails Ratio (OFR) and Outstanding Delivered Ratio (ODR) 
Our metric for the open interest of undelivered positions is the Outstanding Fails Ratio (OFR), defined 
for each day t as the number of outstanding FTDs as of day t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding of 
the firm (which we obtain from CRSP).
21
 Our approach is similar in spirit to previous literature that relies on 
measures of ‘relative short interest’ (DeChow et al., 2001; Desai et al., 2002; Chen and Singal, 2003).
 
 We 
similarly estimate the Outstanding Delivered Ratio (ODR) as the open interest of timely-delivered short sales 
positions scaled by the number of shares outstanding. The open interest of timely-delivered short sales is 
computed by subtracting the open interest of undelivered positions (i.e., short sales that fail to deliver) from the 
contemporaneous value of open interest of all short sales. Estimates are based on total short-interest data and 
the total volume of daily short sales.  We use the daily change in OFR as our measure of “FTD trades” on the 
same day, and the daily change in ODR as our measure of timely delivered short sales that day. 
                                                 
19
 We thereby exclude securities classified by CRSP as certificates, American trust components, ADRs, SBIs and units 
such as “depositary units” and “units of limited partnership interest”, as well as securities issued by other types of entities 
such as foreign firms, closed-end funds, and REITs.  
20
 That said, we also re-sample without this last constraint and find that our results are robust. 
21
 Reported raw FTD data from the SEC for day t represents fails that have already taken place by that day. Hence, in 
computing outstanding FTDs, we incorporate a minor adjustment to account for the short sales executed on t-1 and t-2 that 
eventually fail to deliver on their respective settlement days, even though the failure has not yet been revealed in reported 
FTDs by day t. That said, this adjustment does not change the economic content or the significance of the results.  
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3.3. Pricing error 
An important measure of pricing efficiency that we use is the “pricing error”. We define the “pricing 
error” on any day as the difference between the observed price on that day and the estimated information-
efficient price for the same day. The unobservable daily estimate of the information-efficient “random-walk” or 
"fundamental" price of the security, a “latent” stochastic variable, is estimated for each sample security using a 
Kalman-filter methodology as in Hamilton (1985). The procedure involves establishing two equations. The first 
equation dictates the evolution of the latent variable, and in our case we assume, in the spirit of Hasbrouck 
(1993), that the logarithm of the stock’s underlying or information-efficient value, , follows a random 
walk with a drift, , and a white noise innovation, , with mean zero and variance :
 
  
 
 The second equation relates the observed and latent variables, i.e., specifies the pricing error process. In 
our case, we assume that the pricing error Y(t) follows a mean-reverting process around zero, with α, the rate of 
mean-reversion, ranging between 0 and 1. Pricing errors correct fully in one period when α is equal to one, and 
not correct at all when α is equal to zero. 
  
 
The observed log of stock price  is the sum of the fundamental price and pricing error:  
    
 
  
 The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, et al., 1977) is employed to compute the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of the unobservable variable, F(t), based on data relating to the observed 
variable, S(t). Hamilton (1985) employs such an approach to estimate expected quarterly inflation, the latent 
variable, based on observed actual inflation. In exactly the same way, we utilize the observed daily stock prices 
to infer the daily unobserved "fundamental price", and hence the daily pricing error, using daily closing price 
data from CRSP. The state-space representation of the system is as follows. 
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To  test the bias and efficacy of our pricing error estimation process, we run 500 simulations of both 
fundamental price and pricing error for a hypothetical stock over 252 trading days assuming a range of volatility 
parameters and mean reversion parameters. In each case, we add the fundamental price and the pricing error to 
arrive at the equivalent of a simulated "observed" price. Then, we run our Kalman-filter estimation procedure 
on this "observed" price series to determine our Kalman-filter estimate of the originally simulated fundamental 
price. Finally, we run a regression of changes in the originally simulated fundamental price on changes in our 
Kalman-filter estimate of that fundamental price. In each and every case, the regression intercept is not 
significantly different from zero, and the regression slope is not significantly different from one; and the root 
mean square error in the estimated fundamental price is economically small in magnitude.  
 
3.4   Other variables and market quality measures 
Table II defines the other variables and measures we use in the paper. The liquidity and the pricing 
efficiency measures and the other variables in Table II are defined and estimated as commonly done in the 
literature and based largely on NYSE TAQ data. 
   
 
4. Empirical results: FTDs, pricing efficiency, and liquidity 
4.1.  Preliminary descriptive analysis of overall sample  
We first sort securities into ten deciles according to mean OFR, computed over the entire sample period 
(January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008). In Table III, we report sample means, medians, and standard deviations of 
the main variables, for the overall sample and for the top and bottom deciles. We find that mean OFR is about 6 
basis points. By construction, OFR varies by decile: the mean is less than 1 basis point in decile 1 and about 43 
basis points in decile 10. Notably, though not reported in the table, OFR is higher prior to the introduction of 
Regulation SHO in January 2005 by an average of about 9 basis points. The mean FTDs to Total Short Interest 
ratio is about 1% for the overall sample, 2.8% for decile 10, and 0.1% for decile 1. We find that ODR is 
similarly higher in decile 10 (13.4%) than in decile 1 (3.95%), which is indicative of a positive correlation 
between ODR and OFR. Securities in deciles 1 and 10 do not differ significantly in terms of mean pricing 
errors. However, securities with higher OFR display significantly higher positive pricing errors and pricing 
error volatility, which is consistent with FTDs intensifying when securities are overpriced. Similarly, higher 
OFR is associated with higher and positive order imbalances and higher stock price volatility but lower spreads. 
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Our analysis also reveals that FTDs are significantly more common for relatively smaller firms, as average 
market capitalization for firms in decile 1 (USD 12.5 billion) is almost ten times larger than for firms in decile 
10 (USD 1.48 billion).  
 
4.2.    Portfolio approach 
 As a first test of the relationship between FTD trades and subsequent market quality, on each day t in 
our sample spanning January 2005 to June 2008, we group the 1,492 securities into nine portfolios based on 
changes in OFR and ODR.
22
 We start by estimating the daily time-series standard deviation in OFR by security. 
On each day, we include securities with a one-standard deviation or greater decrease in OFR into a “Low FTD 
Trades” portfolio and, similarly, securities with a one-standard deviation or greater increase in OFR into a 
“High FTD Trades” portfolio. We include all remaining securities into a “Normal FTD Trades” portfolio. In 
order to control for the extent of timely-delivered short sales, we replicate the same procedure on the basis of 
timely-delivered short sales, proxied by changes in ODR, thus forming the portfolios “Low Delivered Short 
sales”, “Normal Delivered Short sales” and “High Delivered Short sales”. Finally, we intersect those groups of 
securities, forming nine final portfolios. For each portfolio, we compute average changes in our metrics of price 
levels, return volatility, market liquidity, pricing errors, pricing error volatility and order imbalances for the 
following day (t+1). All variables are standardized and winsorized (at three standard deviations) by security. 
We compute next-day average changes for the portfolios “Low FTD Trades, Normal Delivered Short sales” and 
“High FTD Trades, Normal Delivered Short sales” and we further test for differences between these averages. 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Table IV. For the portfolio “High FTD Trades, Normal 
Delivered Short sales”, we find, on the following day, a 14 basis points decrease in pricing error, an 81 basis 
points reduction in pricing error volatility, a 1 basis point decrease in spreads, a 23 basis points decrease in 
order imbalances, and a 6 basis points decrease in stock price volatility – all results being statistically 
significant at the 1% level; we also find a decrease in prices, but the result is not statistically significant. For the 
portfolio “Low FTD Trades, Normal Delivered Short sales”, we observe a statistically significant (at 10% level) 
2 basis points increase in volatility. We further investigate the differences in next-day metrics between the two 
portfolios. The “High FTD Trades” portfolio, compared to the “Low FTD Trades” portfolio, displays lower 
                                                 
22
 Our interest lies in changes in OFR. We form portfolios on changes in ODR to control for the impact of duly-delivered 
short sales on liquidity and pricing efficiency.  
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pricing errors, pricing error volatilities, prices, spreads, order imbalances and volatility, with all results being 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 This initial analysis offers evidence consistent with Hypotheses H1 and H2: high FTD trades are 
followed by next day improvements in both market liquidity and pricing efficiency. Given the limitations of this 
univariate framework, we conduct multivariate analysis in the following section, employing OLS regressions to 
investigate the relationship between FTD trades and subsequent market quality while controlling for timely-
delivered short selling and relevant systematic factors.  
 
4.3. Panel OLS regressions  
We next estimate panel regressions to investigate the relationship between FTD trades and next-day 
market quality metrics: pricing errors, pricing error volatility, prices, return volatility, spreads, and order 
imbalances. Accordingly, we estimate six separate regressions, with changes in market quality metrics as 
responses. Our main explanatory variables are previous-day changes in OFR and ODR, proxying for FTD trades 
and timely-delivered short sales respectively. As controls, we include, in each regression, lagged changes of the 
dependent variable, to account for possible autocorrelations. In addition, to control for systematic effects, we 
include market averages of the changes in the same quality metrics. Finally, when modeling changes in pricing 
errors, we add interaction variables between changes in OFR and ODR and a binary variable identifying 
positive pricing errors, to allow for an asymmetric impact of fails on pricing errors. All regressions contain 
security fixed-effects and standard errors are time-clustered. The models estimated are as follows:  
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We estimate the above parameters with OLS regressions using daily data. Variables definitions are 
included in Table II; the ‘M’ subscript indicates an equally weighted average computed over our entire sample.  
Results for the overall sample are presented in Table V. As reported, an increase in OFR is associated 
with a next-day decrease in pricing error volatility, spreads, order imbalances (all significant at 1%), and return 
volatility (at 5%). An increase in OFR is also associated with a decrease in pricing errors when those are 
positive and a much smaller increase in pricing errors when those are negative (both significant at 1%). Prices 
are not significantly affected.  
This second set of results is highly consistent with our previous findings: FTD trades are related to 
improvements in liquidity and pricing efficiency. We recognize that the correlations documented in this analysis 
are not proof of causation. Hence, we attempt to gain insights into the direction of causality in our system by 
first testing for Granger causality.
23
 For each metric of interest, we test both directions of Granger causality: that 
is, we test whether previous day FTD trades ’Granger-cause’ next-period market quality metrics (PE, PE 
Volatility, Volatility, Spread, OIB, and Logmid). We first find that FTD trades Granger-cause PE, PE Volatility, 
Volatility, Spread, and OIB. Yet, when testing the other side of causality, we find it equally meaningful, as each 
of those variables Granger-causes FTD trades as well. FTD trades and market quality metrics Granger-cause 
each other – and the whole system displays feedback effects over time. Hence, it is necessary for us to 
investigate the impact of FTD trades within a statistical model that allows us to control for inter-temporal 
interdependency amongst all metrics. Accordingly, in the next section, we present results from a VAR model, 
duly accounting for endogenous interrelationships between market quality metrics, FTD trades and timely 
delivered short sales. 
 
4.4. Vector autoregressive framework 
In a third set of tests, we control for endogenous interrelationships using three vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models, with additional exogenous variable(s) added as controls. The system of equations underlying 
each of these models is formally described in Table VI. In VAR Model 1, our VAR variables are changes in 
OFR, ODR, Pricing Error, Volatility, Spread, and Order Imbalance. We add, as predictors in the pricing error 
equation, (1) an interaction between lagged changes in OFR and a lagged binary variable set equal to one when 
pricing error is positive and (2) an interaction between lagged changes in ODR and a lagged binary variable set 
                                                 
23
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry. Results are not included for brevity. 
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equal to one when pricing error is positive. Accordingly, we are able to separately estimate the impact of FTD 
trades and delivered short sales on pricing error when the pricing error is positive in contrast to when the pricing 
error is negative. We add two more predictors to each of the equations in which the change in OFR or ODR are 
the response variables: (3) a lagged binary variable set equal to one when order imbalance is positive and zero 
otherwise and (4) a lagged binary variable set equal to one when pricing error is positive and zero otherwise. 
Finally, in each equation we add, as an exogenous variable, the market-wide equally-weighted average of the 
dependent variable, to control for possible systematic effects. In VAR Model 2, we replace Pricing Error by 
Pricing Error Volatility, or effectively the absolute value of the Pricing Error; given that we do not here model 
pricing error, we do not include the interaction-variables described above in points (1) and (2). VAR Model 3 is 
similar to Model 2, but we replace Pricing Error by Price.  
We estimate VAR Models 1, 2 and 3 separately for each security. The results we report in Table VI are 
based on estimating the models by first standardizing all variables by subtracting the security-specific mean and 
dividing by the security-specific standard deviation, and then winsorizing at three standard deviations from the 
mean.
24
 Based on an analysis of the Schwarz information criteria (SIC), we determine that, for all models, it is 
most appropriate to use a VAR of order one. In order to draw inferences about the true population parameters, 
we average coefficient estimates obtained for each security as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). Similarly, we use 
cross-sectional estimates of standard errors. To account for possible underestimation of those standard errors 
due to cross-correlations, we correct standard errors as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001).  
 We estimate VAR Models 1, 2, and 3 for both our “entire market” sample and for a subset of our 
sample containing only the 10% of securities with the highest FTDs based on mean OFR over the sample 
period, January 2005 to June 2008 (the same sub-sample described as ‘decile 10’ in Table II). We focus on this 
subset of securities with the highest FTDs to find whether the impact of FTD trades differs when they occur 
most frequently. We find that the sign and the significance of the various inter-relationships involved are 
economically reasonable for both samples. For compactness, ease of interpretation and to preserve the focus on 
the specific equations of interest to us, we report in Table VI only those relationships that are relevant to the 
issues addressed in the paper.  In particular, we report, for all three models and for both samples, the coefficient 
                                                 
24
 For robustness, we also estimate all three models without standardizing variables, but we sometimes run into problems 
with the convergence of our maximum likelihood estimation algorithm, likely driven by the extreme differences in 
magnitude across our variables. For those securities for which we manage to obtain results without standardizing variables, 
our results are qualitatively similar to those reported.  
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estimates related to the effects of FTD trades and timely-delivered short sales on each of the market quality 
metrics. We present estimated coefficients and related statistical significance in Table VI, Panels A and B. 
 First, and most importantly, irrespective of the measure used as proxy for pricing efficiency or liquidity, 
FTD trades increase liquidity and improve pricing efficiency, supporting Hypotheses H1 and H2. In particular, 
we reach the following conclusions:  
1. FTD trades significantly reduce positive pricing errors, consistent with short sellers functioning as 
value arbitrageurs (statistically significant at 1%). 
2. FTD trades significantly reduce the volatility of pricing errors, which is also consistent with an increase 
in pricing efficiency (statistically significant at 1%).  
3. FTD trades significantly reduce stock return volatility, consistent with improved market stability 
(significant at 1% in five models and at 5% in the sixth).  
4. FTD trades significantly reduce order-imbalances, consistent with short sellers contributing to 
improvement in liquidity (significant at 1%). 
5. Coefficient estimates uniformly indicate that FTD trades reduce spreads but results are not statistically 
significant.  
6.  Coefficient estimates uniformly indicate that FTD trades reduce prices, but results are not statistically 
significant.  
 Second, we find that the direction and significance of all results relating to the impact of FTD trades are 
qualitatively similar to the direction and significance of all results relating to the impact of short sales that duly 
result in delivery. The main differences lie in the fact that delivered short sales appear to have a statistically 
significant impact on prices and spreads, while the results are not statistically significant for FTD trades 
(estimated coefficients, however, carry the same signs).  
 To further investigate the impact of FTD trades on pricing efficiency and liquidity, we compute impulse 
response functions based on the vector autoregressive models of Table VI. We estimate accumulated impulse 
response function parameters for each security and then present cross-sectional means of the parameter 
estimates. We employ cross-sectional standard errors. We present the results related to accumulated impulse 
response functions depicting the impact of one-standard deviation increase in OFR on pricing error volatility, 
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return volatility, spreads and order imbalances in Figure 1.
25
 For comparison, we present a similar set of 
impulse response functions for the impact of delivered shorts in Figure 2.
26
 As the impulse response functions 
indicate, the impact of FTD trades on market quality metrics – pricing errors, pricing error volatility, prices, 
return volatility, spreads, order imbalances – documented in Table VI occur over the day following the FTD 
trades. On subsequent days, accumulated responses are mostly flat, indicating no further correction or reversal.  
 Our main analysis does not include any measure of trading volume, as trading volume is highly 
correlated with other market quality metrics. Nevertheless, for robustness, we add to the VAR models a 
measure of trading volume based on the daily number of trades for the security of interest.
27
 The core results 
describing the relationship between FTD trades and metrics of market liquidity and pricing efficiency are 
unaffected. We also obtain similar results by utilizing a different metric of trading volume, based on the 
monetary value of shares traded daily. 
 
4.5.    FTD trades vs. timely-delivered short sales  
 Overall, when qualitatively comparing the impact of FTD trades – or short sales that result in FTDs – to 
timely-delivered short sales, the direction and significance of our results are virtually identical, indicating that 
the impact on market quality is very similar irrespective of whether short sales are delivered or not delivered. 
That said, we note that the coefficients measuring the impact on market quality in Table VI, Panels A and B are, 
in most cases, larger in magnitude for timely-delivered short sales relative to FTD trades. This is arguably what 
we should expect given that the vector autoregressive models we employ are based on standardized variables, 
and the average standard deviation of timely-delivered short sales is much greater than that of FTD trades. 
Hence, a one standard deviation change in timely-delivered short selling predictably results in a much greater 
change in the level of overall short selling relative to a one standard deviation change in short selling that results 
in FTDs and a greater level of overall short selling should arguably have a greater beneficial impact on market 
quality. In this context, we next examine the economic significance of the impact of FTD trades and timely-
                                                 
25
 We opt to utilize accumulated, rather than orthogonalized, impulse response functions because, consistent with what is 
expected on the basis of the general econometric literature in this regard, the latter are extremely sensitive to the ordering 
of variables in the model, thus adding a level of arbitrariness to the estimation procedure. In unreported analysis, we 
estimate orthogonalized impulse response functions for models differing in order of the variables and find the results not to 
be robust to the ordering of variables.  
26
 For brevity, we only report impulse response functions related to the VAR models including pricing error volatility, 
omitting the models including pricing errors and prices; given the similarities in estimated and reported VAR coefficients, 
the omitted impulse response function sets are extremely similar. 
27
 Results are not here included for brevity, but are available upon request.  
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delivered short sales by estimating the market-quality impact of FTD trades and timely-delivered short sales 
equal to a given fraction of shares outstanding. The results are reported in Table VI, Panels C and D for the 
impact of FTD trades and timely-delivered short sales respectively. 
Based on the “entire market” sample, we find that FTD trades corresponding to 10 basis points of the 
total number of outstanding shares – approximately equal to a one-standard deviation increase in total short 
interest –leads to about a 1% reduction in spreads, a 1.7% reduction in order imbalances, a 9.8% reduction in 
the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 12.9% decline in pricing error volatility and a 1% reduction in stock 
price volatility. The impact on prices, aside from not being statistically significant, is tiny, with a reduction of 
0.01%. In comparison, again based on the “entire market” sample, we find that delivered short sales 
corresponding to 10 basis points of the total number of outstanding shares leads to about a 0.7% reduction in 
spreads, a 1.3% reduction in order imbalances, a 4.9% reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 
7.4% decline in pricing error volatility and a 0.7% reduction in stock price volatility. The impact on prices is 
similarly tiny, at 0.01%. Overall, the economic significance of the estimated impact of FTD trades and timely-
delivered short sales is of roughly similar magnitude.  Inferences based on the sample with the highest FTD 
trades are weaker (the same quantity of FTD trades leads to smaller market-wide reactions). This suggests that a 
certain volume of FTD trades has a weaker impact when existing levels of outstanding FTDs are higher.  
The bottom-line is that the market-quality impact of short sales that result in timely delivery, as well as 
those that do not, is economically significant and very similar, which is in line with our expectations, since the 
two are indistinguishable at the time of the trade. The impact is also in the direction of being clearly beneficial 
for market quality. Our results provide strong support for Hypotheses H1 and H2. Short sellers, whether they 
deliver on time or with a delay, appear to have a positive effect on market quality, first by enhancing pricing 
efficiency through correction of security overvaluation and reduction of volatility, and second by providing and 
improving liquidity through reduction of order-imbalances and spreads. 
 
4.6.   Robustness Check: threshold-list securities 
 The impact of FTD trades could be different when failures are persistent or long-lived. Accordingly, we 
focus on a sample of securities which displays persistent FTDs – securities that appear on the NYSE Threshold 
List. In accordance to the SEC Regulation SHO, “threshold securities” are securities for which the aggregate 
FTD position for five consecutive settlement days at a registered clearing house totals 10,000 shares or more 
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and equals at least 0.5% of the total number of shares outstanding for the issuer.
28
 From our sample, we identify 
165 securities which appear on the NYSE Threshold List during our sample period. Accordingly, we re-
estimate the VAR model for this subset of securities. Results, reported in Table VI, Panel E, are largely 
consistent with what previously reported: coefficient estimates are of similar magnitude to those obtained with 
the data subset containing the securities with the highest level of FTDs.
29
 
 
4.7. Robustness check: NASDAQ securities 
As a further robustness test, we re-estimate the VAR model with a sample of securities with NASDAQ 
as a primary exchange. We apply the same filters in creating the sample as we did for our overall, NYSE-based, 
sample: we focus on securities with share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP, for which we have at least 18 months of 
continuous trading data and with no significant changes in the number of shares outstanding and we obtain a 
full sample of 2,381 securities. Results are presented in Table VI, Panel F.
30
 In this data subset, similar to our 
NYSE results, we find that FTD trades lead to a next-day decline in positive pricing errors, return volatility, and 
in pricing error volatility. But, estimates display weaker statistical significance and we do not find a significant 
relationship between FTD trades and order imbalances. However, in this context, it is relevant to recognize that 
some factors have made it problematic to use time-series of market-quality metrics, particularly liquidity 
metrics, for NASDAQ securities.
31
 Most importantly in the context of this paper, while NYSE has played the 
dominant role in our sample period in the supply of liquidity for stocks with NYSE as their primary exchange, 
this has not been so for stocks with NASDAQ as their primary exchange. For example, Diether, Lee, and 
Werner (2009) document that, while NYSE accounted for almost 80% of shares sold short in NYSE stocks, 
NASDAQ accounted for less than 35% of the shares sold short in NASDAQ securities. Hence, our estimated 
order-imbalances can potentially be a noisy proxy of the overall order-imbalances of NASDAQ stocks. 
 
                                                 
28
  For the full legal definition offered by the SEC, please refer to: http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm. 
29
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we focus our attention on Threshold Lists and also examine 
NASDAQ securities, which we do in the following section,  
30
 The total number of securities for which we are able to estimate the models presented in Table VI, Panel F ranges from 
2,381 to 2,170. For some securities, despite having the complete dataset, estimation is not possible because of inadequate 
number of positive pricing errors, or negative pricing errors, or order imbalances. 
31
 The fragmentation of trading across several different platforms and systems on NASDAQ has led in the past to difficulty 
in observing and reacting to short-term changes in market variables. For example, quote adjustment has been documented 
to be slower (Jones and Lipson, 1999) and time stamps of trades and quotes on NASDAQ could not always be matched 
(Schultz, 2000). More recently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) do not use NASDAQ 
data in their pricing of liquidity studies apparently because of problems in using NASDAQ-based liquidity measures.   
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4.8.       The market quality impact of exogenous imposition of restrictions on FTD trades. 
In this sub-section, we report the effect on market quality of restrictions on FTD trades. While the VAR 
models address issues of directional causality, our inferences could be affected by possible omitted-variable 
bias. In this context, we utilize the exogenous event described in Section 2.1 – the temporary SEC order 
mandating pre-short selling borrowing arrangements for select securities in July and August 2008 – to confirm 
the causal relation between FTD trades and pricing efficiency or market liquidity. The temporary SEC order is 
an exogenous event that reduces FTD trades. In turn, if FTD trades are beneficial for market quality, the 
imposition of the order should cause deterioration in market quality metrics selectively for the securities and for 
the period during which the order is in force. For each of our 17 sample securities affected by the temporary 
SEC order, and the 17 unique control sample matches, and for each day in the interval January 1, 2008 to 
September 9, 2008, we compute OFR, Pricing Error Volatility, Return, Volatility, Spread, and Order 
Imbalance, as in Table II. We average each of these six variables across securities to obtain a daily mean for the 
affected and control samples. We then run six separate OLS regressions: in each regression, the response 
variable is the affected sample mean of either OFR, Pricing Error Volatility, Return, Volatility, Spread, or 
Order Imbalance, while the explanatory variables include an intercept, the control sample mean of the variable 
of interest and a binary variable, Event, set equal to 1 on all days during which restrictions were in place and 
equal to 0 on all other days. Our results are presented in Table VII. We observe higher return volatility and 
pricing error volatility during the temporary order period, both significant at the 1% level. We also document 
higher spreads, significant at 10%. The impact of the SEC order on returns and order imbalances is not 
statistically significant. Overall, our results indicate that mandating stock-borrowing arrangements prior to 
executing a short sale adversely impacts the stock’s liquidity and hampers the price discovery process, 
providing strong support to Hypotheses H1 and H2.
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4.9.     FTD trades: market makers vs. public traders 
Market-makers routinely sell-short to manage their inventory in the course of providing liquidity; such 
short selling does not always involve pre-arranged borrowing and occasionally leads to FTDs. The SEC has 
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 Our results are consistent with contemporaneous work of Kolasinski, et al. (2010). While their main focus is on the 
different impact of restrictions vs. bans on short selling, they analyze the same event (interpreting it as a temporary short 
selling restriction) and find that the order negatively impacted liquidity of the affected securities. Our results on this 
particular issue are also consistent with contemporaneous work of Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010). 
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regarded the use of FTD trades by market-makers as bona fide and positive for market liquidity.
33
 It is therefore 
conceivable that the beneficial effects on market quality of FTD trades arise due to such market-making 
activities, and that there are no beneficial effects from FTD trades of public traders. We define the term “public 
trader” in this context to mean all market participants other than registered market-makers. Notably, it is these 
public traders that have been the primary focus of negative media and regulatory attention. If there are no 
beneficial effects of public-trader FTD trades, our estimated FTD-related improvement in market quality will be 
relatively weaker for securities that have a relatively greater proportion of public-trader FTD trades. To estimate 
the impact of public-trader FTD trades relative to the impact of market-maker FTD trades, we classify securities 
based on the proportion of FTDs originating from public traders. In order to accomplish that, we employ 
another exogenous event – an SEC ban in September 2008 that affected only public-trader FTD trades but not 
market-maker FTD trades: SEC temporary rule 204T (later made permanent).  
SEC rule 204T required all market participants other than registered market makers to purchase or 
borrow securities to close out their FTD position by the beginning of day t+4, effectively banning FTDs for 
anyone other than a market maker. Hence, we compute average FTDs across our entire sample of NYSE 
securities for two periods: pre-204T from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008; and post-204T from January 1, 
2009 to December 31, 2010. We intentionally omit the period July to October 2008 because of multiple short 
selling rule changes, and omit November and December 2008 to allow outstanding FTD positions to fully clear 
and thereby enable accurately gauging the impact of post-204T FTDs. Across all securities, we find a drop in 
average OFR of approximately 71%, suggesting that, on average, less than 30% of all FTDs was due to market-
makers prior to September 2008.
34
 For each sample security, we use the proportional change in mean OFR 
between the two sub-periods as our proxy for FTD trades by public traders. We accordingly rank securities on 
the basis of this proportional decline and allocate securities to terciles. We then re-estimate our VAR for 
January 2005 to June 2008 for the two terciles “Low Proportion of Public Traders” (i.e., securities with the 
lowest decline in mean OFR) and “High Proportion of Public Traders” (i.e., securities with the highest decline 
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 The SEC has acknowledged that the use of FTDs by market-makers could be bonafide positive for market liquidity. SEC 
Report "Key Points about Regulation SHO", April 11, 2005, updated 2008 says: “because it may take a market maker 
considerable time to purchase or arrange to borrow the security, a market maker engaged in bona fide market making, 
particularly in a fast-moving market, may need to sell the security short without having arranged to borrow shares”. In a 
similar vein and context, SEC Report No. 450, March 18, 2009 states that the SEC “has repeatedly stressed the fact that 
the practice can provide needed market liquidity in certain circumstances”. 
34
 The SEC has also analyzed FTDs around Rule 204T removing the right to fail except for market-makers. They report an 
overall drop in FTDs of about 70% (as against a 100% drop in July/August 2008 when pre-trade borrowing arrangements 
were mandated for selected stocks), indicating that market-maker FTDs averaged about 30% of FTDs prior to Rule 204T.  
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in mean OFR). Our underlying assumption here is that the number of market-maker FTD trades is fairly 
constant over time and that the observed decline is a proxy for the proportion of public-trader FTD trades.  
Our results are reported in Table VIII. For both samples, our coefficient estimates are of the same sign 
as those of the overall sample. For the “High Proportion of Public Traders” sub-sample, all previously 
documented results remain strong and statistically significant even though the sample size is much smaller than 
the overall sample. For the “Low Proportion of Public Traders” subsample, we observe statistically significant 
parameter estimates for the impact on pricing error volatility, returns volatility, and order imbalances. Estimates 
are not statistically significant for spreads and pricing errors. Our overall results indicate that, if anything, the 
impact of FTD trades is stronger for the subset of securities with a relatively high proportion of FTD trades 
from public traders, rather than the subset with a high proportion of market maker initiated FTD trades. Hence, 
at the very least, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the beneficial effects of FTD trades arise 
entirely from market-makers.  
 
5.   Empirical results: FTD Trades and the 2008 Financial Crisis 
 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, it has been alleged that short sellers have, through FTD trades, 
caused or accelerated sharp declines in stock prices, particularly of financial firms, and created conditions that 
triggered credit downgrades in order to profit from the downward price spiral and the eventual collapse of the 
financial institutions involved.
35
 In this context, we examine whether significant FTD trades preceded (and 
hence potentially triggered) the price crashes associated with the four major casualties of the 2008 financial 
crisis, i.e., Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG and Merrill, and similarly preceded credit downgrades and large price 
decline episodes in other financial firms; or did significant FTD trades take place after these price crashes and 
in response to negative public news.  
 The first large financial casualty of the 2008 financial crisis was Bear Stearns, the fifth largest 
investment banking firm in the nation at the time of its demise. We analyze OFR on the days preceding and 
immediately following the dramatic loss of market value that led to the demise of the firm. Figure 3 provides a 
time-line about the crisis. Outstanding suspicions about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns were reported in the 
media from March 10 onwards, along with news that the company’s management was repeatedly denying 
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 A commentary in Euromoney (December 2008) claimed that “Fails to deliver in the US equity market have exacerbated 
the sharp declines in share prices of financials”. Similar opinions were expressed by Rolling Stone (October 2009) and 
Bloomberg.com (October 29, 2008). 
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rumors about such problems. The first major price-crash took place on Friday, March 14, when the price per 
share dropped from $57 to $30 after a 9 a.m. announcement that Bear would receive an unprecedented loan 
from the Federal Reserve System; and two days later, on Sunday March 16, JP Morgan Chase proposed buying 
Bear Stearns for $2 per share.
36
 When markets opened on March 17, a second major price crash materialized, 
and the price dropped to a close of $4.81.  
 We compute OFR for Bear Stearns on each trading day from January 1 to March 28, 2008. We also 
compute, as a control variable, an equal weighted average OFR for four other financial institutions with the 
same primary SIC code as Bear Stearns, and with the closest market value as of the end of the fiscal year 2007. 
We test for the statistical significance each day of the difference, i.e. the “abnormal” OFR of Bear Stearns.37 
Our results are presented in Table IX, Panel A.   
 Even though negative media attention started on March 10, Table IX, Panel A and Figure 3 show that 
abnormal OFR was statistically insignificant or significantly negative up to March 11. While OFR did increase 
significantly on March 12 and 13, the increase was still relatively tiny from an economic perspective since it 
was tiny relative to the total number of shares outstanding, tiny relative to the typical overall short volume, and 
tiny relative to what took place on or after March 14: OFR was only 1.06% of shares outstanding until market 
close on March 13. OFR increased to 2.24% (t-stat. 20.7) on March 14, but increased massively only on March 
17, reaching 12.18% (t-stat. 137.3). Importantly, given that the Fed announcement was at the start of trading on 
March 14, even the (relatively small) increase in OFR on March 14 was clearly subsequent to the public release 
of tangibly negative news in the form of the announcement and the consequent immediate precipitous price-
drop. By the time OFR spiked on March 17, the company was already in an open distress sale. The evidence 
clearly shows that the abnormal incidence of FTD trades did not precede the price decline but followed it; and 
the decline in stock price was triggered by other well-identified negative economic news. Consistent with our 
previous results, short sellers appear to be facilitating price discovery, rather than increasing pricing errors. 
Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis H3. 
 The second notable casualty of the financial crisis of 2008 was Lehman. To investigate the link between 
FTD trades and Lehman’s stock price crash, we employ the same method we used for Bear Stearns: we analyze 
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 See, for example, The Wall Street Journal (March 15, 2008) and  J.P. Morgan News Release (March 16, 2008). 
37
 The four control stocks are: Raymond James Financial Corporation, Ameritrade Holdings Corporation, Ameriprise 
Financial Inc. and Charles Schwab Corporation. To construct a t-statistic for the difference in means: we compute the 
mean and standard error of this difference over the period January 1 to February 15, 2008; we subtract this historic mean 
from the daily difference and divide the result by the historic estimate of the standard deviation of the difference. 
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OFR on the days surrounding the dramatic loss of market value of the firm on September 9, 2008. Our results 
are in Table IX, Panel B. In Figure 4A we present the relationship between OFR and stock price for the period 
from January 2008 to Lehman’s bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. We present a closer look at the period 
surrounding Lehman’s bankruptcy in Figure 4B. The above table and figures indicate abnormally low OFR in 
the days leading to September 9: only around 0.01%.
38
 But, by September 9, the firm’s stock price had already 
lost approximately 87% of its value as of the beginning of the year. The biggest single-day price drop, about 
45%, occurred on September 9, following news that talks with the Korea Development Bank (previously 
rumored to be considering a 25% stake in Lehman) had failed. While OFR increases on that day, OFR is still 
less than 0.16% of shares outstanding. Abnormal OFR increased more dramatically only after September 10, 
well after widespread coverage of negative news about Lehman and the associated price crash. On September 
11, as shareholders rejected a management rescue plan, the stock price fell by an additional 42% and OFR 
further increased to 3.3%. Over the following days, talks of a possible acquisition by Bank of America and 
Barclays failed, triggering further declines in stock price and an increase in OFR to 4.9%. Lehman announced 
its bankruptcy on September 15, and OFR increased beyond 8% on September 17. In sum, our analysis shows 
that the incidence of FTD trades, even at its peak, was too low to justify the decline in price that took place. 
Again, we find no support for Hypothesis H3. 
 We report the relationship between OFR and the stock price for Merrill and AIG in Figure 5 and Figure 
6 respectively. In both cases, the stock price declines were fairly gradual through the year and were not 
accompanied by any significant increase in FTDs. For Merrill, OFR reached its highest value of only 0.18% on 
October 14, 2008, well after the Merrill had lost most of its value. AIG had also lost about 40% of its market 
value by the end of August 2008, and the largest single-day price drop was on September 15, 2008 when 
Standard & Poor’s cut AIG’s credit rating. Following the announcement, the company’s stock price dropped by 
about 60%. Yet, OFR reached its highest value only a fortnight later on September 29, 2008, and even this 
highest value was only 0.32%. Given that OFR remained so low all through the financial crisis period for both 
Merrill and AIG, we do not engage in any further statistical testing. We find no support for Hypothesis H3.  
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 An article in Bloomberg (March 19, 2009), notes that a rumor about Barclays PLC buying Lehman for a 25% discount to 
market value was responsible for a 11% fall in Lehman’s stock price on June 30. We find that OFR spikes significantly on 
June 27, the day preceding the rumor, but the spike is still just 0.06%, far too miniscule to conclude that FTD trades, rather 
than negative information, was responsible for the price decline. 
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 We run further tests, in an attempt to find evidence of the distorting influence of FTD trades. In this 
context, we examine FTD trades around credit rating downgrades for a sample of financial securities. We do not 
report results here for brevity - however, we find that OFR is abnormally low in the days preceding the credit 
rating downgrade. This evidence is again inconsistent with our hypothesis H3. Similarly, we analyze whether 
FTD trades intensify prior to large price drops. We identify a sample of large price drops in NYSE securities 
during 2008 and find, overall, no evidence of spikes in OFR prior to such events. Further, we focus on large 
price drops for small-capitalization securities and for highly levered firms, as those are likely target for “bear 
raids”. Once more, we fail to find any evidence of FTD trades preceding large price drops.  
 
6.       Conclusions 
We investigate the collective net impact on market quality of FTD trades, i.e., trades that result in FTDs 
(“fails to deliver”). The total number of FTDs on any day is the “open interest” of undelivered positions on that 
day. Given the nature of the US electronic trade settlement system for stocks, FTDs should arise almost 
exclusively from short sales, and that is fully supported by our empirical evidence. Hence, FTD trades represent 
short sales that fail to deliver. The consensus in extant literature is that, overall, short sales are beneficial for 
liquidity and pricing efficiency. In this context, we analyze whether FTD trades have the same beneficial impact 
on liquidity and pricing efficiency as timely delivered short sales.  
For a sample of 1,492 NYSE securities covering a period of 42 months, we show that FTD trades 
equivalent to 10 basis points of the number of outstanding shares lead to a 1% reduction in spreads, a 2% 
reduction in order imbalances, a 10% reduction in the magnitude of positive pricing errors, a 13% decline in 
pricing error volatility, and a 1% reduction in stock price volatility. Further, these results are driven not just by 
market-maker FTD trades, but also by public-trader FTD trades. They are also robust for securities with high 
levels of FTDs and those with persistent FTDs. We also show that a temporary SEC order restricting FTD 
trades in select financial securities in the summer of 2008 led to higher absolute pricing errors, higher spreads, 
and lower trading volumes. Furthermore, we find that the beneficial effects on market quality metrics of FTD 
trades are similar to the beneficial effects of timely-delivered short sales.  
We do not also find any evidence linking FTD trades to the failures of the flagship victims of the 2008 
financial crisis: Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill, and AIG. We find that abnormal increases in FTDs took place 
after and not before their major stock price declines and associated negative news; and hence the decline in 
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stock prices of those financial institutions was not triggered by FTD trades. We also analyze FTD trades around 
credit rating downgrades and around the steepest stock price declines of financial firms during our 2008 
financial crisis. We find, yet again, that FTD trades lag price declines, suggesting that the direction of 
significant causality is from steep price falls to FTD trades, not vice-versa. Overall, our results indicate that, 
sharply contrary to media and regulatory perceptions, short sellers did not precipitate the collapse of major 
financial firms in 2008 by failing to deliver. 
While we focus on a sample of NYSE securities, we replicate our analysis, with consistent conclusions, 
also for a sample of over 2,300 NASDAQ securities over the same period. We do, however, leave a further 
detailed analysis of the differential impact of FTD trades on non-NYSE securities as an open issue for future 
research. We also note that data limitations constrain our analysis to the aggregate impact over daily time 
intervals. Analysis including intra-day timestamps of FTD trades could potentially provide additional insights; 
unfortunately, such data is, to our knowledge, not presently available.  
Our findings have important implications for regulatory policy. While there clearly needs to be zero 
tolerance for individual cases of abusive FTD trades, we find no evidence indicating that FTD trades in 
aggregate systematically and manipulatively precipitated price declines, even in the extreme situation of the 
2008 financial crisis. Instead, the gently regulated FTD regime that existed after Regulation SHO up to mid-
2008 was net beneficial for pricing efficiency and market liquidity. In this context, the virtual removal of the 
alternative to fail for the vast majority of market participants appears debatable, since the alternative to fail 
arguably reduces stock borrowing costs at the time when such costs are the highest, and thereby protects traders 
from the extreme lack of liquidity sometimes seen in the less regulated stock borrowing market. This alternative 
to fail is valuable for markets, also because it can prevent (potentially manipulative) distortions in the stock 
borrowing and lending market from getting transformed into serious pricing and liquidity distortions in the 
mainstream stock market. Regulators could alternatively consider progressive fines for settlement delays rather 
than blanket removal of the alternative to fail. Further, regulation should focus on how best to generate liquidity 
and transparency in the stock borrowing market.  
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 Table I – FTDs and Short Sales  
 
This table presents the average number of fails-to-deliver (FTDs) scaled by the contemporaneous number of shares outstanding for “Event Securities” and 
“Control Securities”. “Event Securities” are 17 stocks that were subject to the imposition of the SEC Order requiring pre-short sale stock borrowing 
arrangements between July 21, 2008 and August 12, 2008, i.e., the “Order Period”. While the order affected 19 securities, we have data for 17 of these: 
Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, 
Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS, HSBC Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho Financial Group, 
Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. “Control Securities” are a sample of 17 market capitalization and industry matched stocks 
that were not subject to any relevant regulatory changes during the “Order Period”. The “Pre-Order Period” refers to the interval January 1, 2008 to July 20, 
2008. The “Post-Order Period” refers to the interval August 13, 2008 to September 2, 2008. The number of FTDs scaled by shares outstanding is reported 
in basis points and computed for “Event Securities” and “Control Securities” on a daily basis over the interval January 1, 2008 to August 12, 2008. 
Reported t-values are for a test of differences in mean FTDs (scaled by shares outstanding) between the indicated order sub-periods and the “Pre-Order 
Period” and between “Event Securities” and “Control Securities”. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
 
  Event Securities Control Securities Difference (Event-Control) 
  Mean (bps) t value Mean (bps) t value Mean (bps) t value 
Pre Order Period 4.88  
  
0.51  
  
4.37  9.43 *** 
                  
Order Period, 1st Week 0.57  
 
  2.79  
  
-2.23  -4.81 *** 
Order Period, 1st Week-Pre Order  -4.31  -9.28 *** 2.29  49.06 *** -6.60  -14.23 *** 
                    
Order Period, 2nd Week 0.17  
 
  0.46  
  
-0.29  -0.63   
Order Period, 2nd Week-Pre Order  -4.70  -10.13 *** -0.04  -0.91 *** -4.66  -10.06 *** 
                    
Order Period, 3rd Week 0.12  
 
  0.48  
  
-0.36  -0.79   
Order Period, 3rd Week-Pre Order  -4.76  -10.25 *** -0.03  -0.54  -4.73  -10.21 *** 
                    
Order Period, 3rd Week, Last Day 0.00  
 
  0.20  
  
-0.20  -0.79   
Order Period, 3rd Week, Last Day-Pre Order  -4.88  -10.55 *** 0.20  6.97 *** -5.08  -10.00 *** 
                    
Post Order Period 1.39  
  
0.17  
  
1.22  2.64 *** 
Post Order - Order Period, 3rd Week 1.28  2.75 *** -0.31  -0.67  1.59  3.42 *** 
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Table II - Variable Definitions 
 
Table II defines the variables used in our analysis. All variables are daily, unless otherwise specified. 
 
Short Selling 
Outstanding FTD Ratio (OFR) Ratio of the estimated number of outstanding fails to deliver 
over total shares outstanding.  
Outstanding Delivered Short Ratio 
(ODR) 
Ratio of the estimated number of outstanding delivered shorted 
shares over total shares outstanding.  
FTD Trades Trades that result in FTDs proxied by daily changes in OFR 
    
Pricing Error   
Pricing Error (PE) The non-random walk component of a daily return series 
estimated using a Kalman filter methodology. 
Negative Pricing Error (Negative PE) A variable set equal to the pricing error when pricing error is 
negative, to zero otherwise. 
Positive Pricing Error (Positive PE) A variable set equal to the pricing error when pricing error is 
positive, to zero otherwise. 
Pricing Error Volatility (PE Volatility) The absolute value of the pricing error. 
Positive PE Dum A binary variable set equal to one if pricing error is positive, to 
zero otherwise.  
    
Liquidity Related Metrics   
Order Imbalance (OIB) The daily sum of the 5-minute difference between the market 
value of shares traded in buyer initiated trades and the market 
value of shares traded in seller initiated trades, divided by total 
daily dollar trading volume.  
Positive OIB Dum A binary variable set equal to 1 if OIB is positive and to zero 
otherwise. 
Spread The daily average of the ratio of the difference between bid and 
ask and the mid-quote.  
Volume Daily number of shares traded. 
    
Other   
Price The natural log of the daily average of the 5-minute midquote. 
Volatility  The daily standard error of the 5-minute stock price return. 
Market Value The number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing 
price for the day. 
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Table III - Summary Statistics 
 
 
All variables are as defined in Table II. The sample is built as follows: OFR is computed for all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) listed 
for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no daily large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding and for which we had 
all required data (n= 1,492). We rank each security by mean OFR and allocate securities on that basis to decile 1 (lowest) through 10 (highest). Daily statistics are computed 
by security, security averages are further averaged over deciles and for the entire sample.  This table reports mean, median and standard deviation for the sample, means for 
deciles 1 and 10 and the difference between those, along with results of a t-test for differences in means across deciles 1 and 10. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
Median 
Sample 
STD 
Decile 1 
Mean 
Decile 10 
Mean 
Decile 10 
- Decile 1 
p-value 
OFR  0.06% 0.01% 0.22% <0.01% 0.43% 0.40% <0.01 *** 
ODR 5.45% 4.34% 5.30% 3.95% 13.38% 9.43% <0.01 *** 
     FTDs to Total Short Interest 0.97% 0.43% 5.09% 0.10% 2.77% 2.67% <0.01 *** 
Pricing Error  -0.15% 0.00% 4.33% 0.02% -0.50% -0.52% 0.35   
Positive Pricing Error 0.51% 0.10% 1.47% 0.38% 1.11% 0.73% <0.01 *** 
Pricing Error Volatility 1.18% 0.21% 4.96% 0.74% 2.75% 2.01% <0.01 *** 
Order Imbalance 6.72% 6.92% 5.71% 3.84% 7.98% 4.14% <0.01 *** 
Spread 0.18% 0.11% 0.27% 0.38% 0.26% -0.12% 0.01 ** 
Volatility 0.21% 0.20% 0.08% 0.21% 0.29% 0.08% <0.01 *** 
Market Value (US$ M) $8,223  $2,088  $2,421  $12,500  $1,480  ($11,020) <0.01 *** 
Number of Obs. 1,492 1,492 1,492 149 150       
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Table IV – FTD Trades and Market Quality, Portfolio Approach 
 
All variables are as defined in Table II. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security. The sample is built as follows:  we include all NYSE common stock of US-
based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and 
with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. The resulting sample includes 1,492 securities. On each day t between January 2005 and June 2008, we 
allocate securities from the sample with a one-standard deviation or greater decrease in OFR into a ‘Low FTD Trades’ portfolio and, similarly, securities with a one-standard 
deviation or greater increase in OFR into a ‘High FTD Trades’ portfolio. We include all remaining securities into a ‘Medium FTD Trades’ portfolio. In order to control for 
the extent of delivered short selling, we replicate the same procedure on the bases of the intensity of delivered short selling, proxied by changes in ODR, thus forming the 
portfolios ‘Low Delivered Short sales’, ‘Normal Delivered Short sales’ and ‘High Delivered Short sales’. Finally, we intersect those groups of portfolios, forming nine final 
portfolios. For each portfolio, we then compute averages of changes in our measures of returns, return volatility, market liquidity, pricing errors and order imbalances for the 
following day (t+1). The table presents results for the ‘High FTD Trades, Normal Delivered Short sales’ and the ‘Low FTD Trades, Normal Delivered Short sales’ portfolios, 
along with results of a test for differences between them. p-values are from two-sided t-tests. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Response Variable 
High  FTD Trades,  
Normal Delivered 
Short sales 
p-value 
Low  FTD Trades,  
Normal Delivered 
Short sales 
p-value Difference p-value 
∆PE(t+1) -0.14% 0.01     ** 0.04% 0.37   -0.18% <0.01  *** 
∆PE Volatility(t+1) -0.81% <0.01  *** 0.02% 0.66   -0.84% <0.01  *** 
∆Price(t+1) -0.15% 0.39   0.38% 0.33  -0.53% <0.01  *** 
∆Volatility(t+1)               -0.06% <0.01  *** 0.02% 0.07 * -0.08% <0.01  *** 
∆Spread(t+1) -0.01% <0.01  *** 0.00% 0.63   -0.01% <0.01  *** 
∆OIB(t+1) -0.23% <0.01  *** 0.07% 0.32   -0.30% <0.01  *** 
N (days) 845     848           
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Table V – FTD Trades and Market Quality, OLS Regressions 
This table presents results for panel regressions with firm fixed effects and time-clustered standard errors. Metrics of market quality (listed in column headings) are regressed 
on lagged values of the predictors (listed in the column labeled ‘predictors’). All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, expressed in first-order differences, 
and defined as in Table II. The sample is built as follows: we include all NYSE common stocks of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and 
TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. The 
resulting sample includes 1,492 securities. The “Market” variable for a given predictor on day t is obtained by averaging the related variable across all securities on day t. All 
variables are differenced (subtracting the previous day’s value). The p-values are in italics.  “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Predictors Δ Pricing Error(t) Δ Pricing Error Volatility(t) Δ Price(t) Δ Volatility(t) Δ Spread(t) Δ OIB(t) 
Δ OFR(t-1) 0.015 -0.020 ~ 0.001 -0.005 -0.011 -0.022 
  <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 0.96 0.05* * <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
Δ ODR(t-1) 0.195 -0.275 -0.004 -0.070 -0.098 -0.261 
  0.02 *** 0.03 ** 0.21 0.31 0.08 * <0.01 *** 
Δ Pricing Error (t-1) -0.349           
  <0.01 ***           
Δ OFR(t-1)*Positive PE(t-1) -0.033           
  <0.01 ***           
Δ ODR(t-1)*Positive PE(t-1) 0.195           
  0.02 **           
Δ Pricing Error Volatility(t-1)   -0.376         
    <0.01 ***         
Δ Price(t-1)     -0.025       
      <0.01 ***       
 Δ Volatility(t-1)       -0.194     
        <0.01 ***     
Δ Spread(t-1)         -0.321   
          <0.01 ***   
Δ OIB(t-1)           -0.448 
            <0.01 *** 
Δ Market Pricing Error(t) 0.856           
  <0.01 ***           
Δ Market Pricing Error Volatility(t)   0.836         
    <0.01 ***         
Δ Market Price(t-1)     0.997       
      <0.01 ***       
Δ Market Volatility(t)       0.915     
        <0.01 ***     
Δ Market Spread(t)         0.875   
          <0.01 ***   
Δ Market OIB(t)           0.802 
            <0.01 *** 
Number of Firm-Days 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 1,001,656 
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Table VI - FTD Trades and Market Quality, VAR Analysis 
This table provides results for the estimation of three vector autoregressive models of order one: VAR with Pricing 
Error (Model 1), VAR with Pricing Error Volatility (Model 2) and VAR with Price (Model 3). All variables are 
standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table II. The ‘entire market’ sample is built as 
follows: we include all common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with NYSE as the primary 
exchange, available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 
to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. For the ‘most FTDs’ 
sample, we rank each security by mean OFR, and allocate securities on that basis to decile 1 (lowest) through 10 
(highest); the securities included in decile 10 constitute the ‘most FTDs’ sample. The VAR models are defined 
below; the subscripts M and t indicate, respectively, the market-wide average of the variable of interest and day t.  
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Table VI Panels A and B are extracts of estimates of the parameters in Models 1, 2 and 3 above and report results pertaining to the impact of, respectively, OFR and ODR. 
Reported parameter estimates are averages of parameters estimated by security. Significance is tested employing a cross-sectional estimate of the standard error of the 
parameter estimate, as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000). The p-values from two-sided t-tests are in italics below the parameter estimate. “*”, “**”, and “***” 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Panel A - Impact of FTDs  
Sample 
Response 
Δ PE 
Δ PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
Δ PE 
Volatility 
Δ Price Δ Volatility Δ Spread Δ OIB 
A:  Overall 0.046 -0.123     -0.064 -0.016 -0.046 
1,402 Securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     0.01 ** 0.19 <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs 0.165 -0.288     -0.124 -0.008 -0.084 
150 securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.79 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall     -0.069   -0.070 -0.015 -0.046 
1,418 Securities     <0.01***   0.02 ** 0.24 <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs     -0.159   -0.138 -0.005 -0.083 
150 securities     <0.01***   <0.01 *** 0.88 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall       ~-0.001 -0.064 -0.014 -0.046 
1,418 Securities       0.86 <0.01 *** 0.36 <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs       -0.008 -0.131 -0.010 -0.087 
150 securities       0.28 <0.01 *** 0.73 <0.01 *** 
 
Panel B - Impact of Delivered Short Selling 
Sample 
Response 
Δ PE 
Δ PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
Δ PE 
Volatility 
Δ Price Δ Volatility Δ Spread Δ OIB 
A:  Overall 0.590 -1.494     -0.996 -0.237 -0.819 
1,402 Securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     0.01 ** 0.19 <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs 1.006 -1.739     -1.230 -0.072 -0.758 
150 securities <0.01 *** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.37 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall     -0.927   -1.040 -0.222 -0.808 
1,418 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs     -1.027   -1.290 -0.065 -0.754 
150 securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.43 <0.01 *** 
A: Overall       -0.023 -0.991 -0.219 -0.811 
1,418 Securities       <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
B: Most FTDs       -0.025 -1.254 -0.081 -0.765 
150 securities       0.21 <0.01 *** 0.30 <0.01 *** 
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Table VI Panels C and D present the effect on the market quality metrics included in Models 1, 2 and 3 of an increase in Outstanding FTD Ratio (OFR) and Outstanding 
Delivered Short Ratio (ODR) equivalent to 10 basis points of the number of outstanding shares. We report the impact on the response variable as a proportion of the mean of 
the response variable. Percentages presented in bold are significant at 10% or lower. 
 
Panel C: Impact of a Change in Outstanding FTD Ratio (OFR) equal to 10 Basis Points of the number of outstanding shares 
 
  Overall Sample Most FTDs Sample 
Response Variable 
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2        
(PE Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2        
(PE Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Positive PE -9.81%     -6.74%     
PE Volatility   -12.92%     -9.43%   
Price     -0.01%     -0.04% 
Volatility -1.04% -1.14% -1.04% -0.84% -0.94% -0.89% 
Spread -1.03% -0.99% -0.92% -0.14% -0.08% -0.17% 
OIB -1.75% -1.72% -1.73% -1.80% -1.79% -1.87% 
 
 
Panel D: Impact of a Change in Outstanding Delivered Short Ratio (ODR) equal to 10 Basis Points of the number of outstanding shares 
 
  Overall Sample Most FTDs Sample 
Response Variable 
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2        
(PE Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Model 1     
(PE)          
Model 2       
 (PE Volatility)     
Model 3    
(Price)             
Positive PE -4.90%     -2.98%     
PE Volatility   -7.37%     -4.53%   
Price     -0.01%     -0.01% 
Volatility -0.69% -0.72% -0.69% -0.62% -0.65% -0.63% 
Spread -0.65% -0.61% -0.60% -0.09% -0.09% -0.11% 
OIB -1.31% -1.30% -1.30% -1.20% -1.20% -1.22% 
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Table VI Panels E and F are extracts of estimates of the parameters in Models 1, 2 and 3 above and report results pertaining to the impact of OFR. Panel E presents results 
from a subset of the ‘entire market’ dataset discussed in panels A-D; the sample includes all common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with NYSE 
listed as the primary exchange, available in the CRSP and TAQ databases, listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, with no large 
changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding and that appear, for at least one day, on the NYSE-published list of Threshold Securities. Panel F presents results from a 
dataset including NASDAQ securities: we include all common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with NASDAQ listed as the primary exchange, 
available in the CRSP and TAQ databases, listed for at least 18 months over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number 
of shares outstanding. Reported parameter estimates are averages of parameters estimated by security. Significance is tested employing a cross-sectional estimate of the 
standard error of the parameter estimate, as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000). The p-values from two-sided t-tests are in italics below the parameter estimate. “*”, 
“**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Panel E - Impact of FTDs, Threshold Securities 
Sample Size 
Response 
Δ PE 
Δ PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
Δ PE 
Volatility 
Δ Price Δ Volatility Δ Spread Δ OIB 
164 Securities 
0.153 -0.258   
  -0.117 -0.022 -0.083 
<0.01 *** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.19 <0.01 *** 
165 Securities 
    -0.135   -0.129 -0.018 -0.084 
    <0.01***   <0.01 *** 0.32 <0.01 *** 
165 Securities 
      -0.008 -0.124 -0.023 -0.088 
      
0.20 <0.01 *** 0.20 <0.01 *** 
 
Panel F - Impact of FTDs, NASDAQ Sample 
Sample Size 
Response 
Δ PE 
Δ PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
Δ PE 
Volatility 
Δ Price Δ Volatility Δ Spread Δ OIB 
2170 Securities 
0.076 -0.136 
    -0.064 -0.014 -0.025 
0.06* 0.05**     0.07* 0.76 0.63 
2381 Securities 
    -0.095   -0.064 0.002 0.003 
    <0.01***   0.08* 0.98 0.91 
2380 Securities 
      0.013 -0.056 0.005 0.020 
      0.06* 0.09* 0.95 0.54 
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Table VII –The Impact of Restrictions on FTDs imposed by the SEC between July 21, 2008 and August 12, 2008. 
 
The following table presents parameter estimates and related two-sided p-values (in italics, grey font) from five OLS regressions, one for each variable of interest: OFR, 
Pricing Error Volatility, Price, Volatility, Spread, and Order Imbalance. All variables are computed daily over the interval January 1, 2008 to September 9, 2008. In each k
th
 
(1<= k <= 6) regression, the response variable is the mean value of the k
th
 variable of interest for the sample of the 17 stocks that were subject to the SEC mandate requiring 
pre-short sale stock borrowing arrangements. The ban affected 19 securities, but we have data for 17 of these: Bank of America Corporation, Barclays, Bear Stearns 
Companies Inc., Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank Group AG, Allianz SE, Goldman, Sachs Group Inc, Royal Bank ADS, HSBC Holdings PLC ADS, J. P. 
Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Mizuho Financial Group, Inc., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. Explanatory variables include, in 
each regression, an intercept, the mean value of the k
th
 variable of interest for the control sample, Control, and a binary variable, Event, equal to 1 between July 21, 2008 and 
August 12, 2008. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table II. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. The OLS regression equation is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictors OFR PE Volatility Return Volatility Spread OIB 
Intercept 0.001 0.197 -0.002 -0.038 -0.001 0.017 
  <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 0.16 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
Control 2.014 0.625 1.179 1.353 0.941 0.496 
  <0.01 *** 0.33 <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 
Event -0.001 0.074 -0.006 0.007 ~0.001 -0.017 
  <0.01 *** <0.01 *** 0.11 <0.01 *** 0.10 * 0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tktkkkktk ControlEventVariableResponse ,,,2,1,    
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Table VIII – Impact of FTD Trades for Securities with High/Low Proportion of FTDs by Public Traders relative to Market Makers 
 
This table provides results for the estimation of three vector autoregressive models of order one: VAR with Pricing Error (Model 1), VAR with Pricing Error Volatility 
(Model 2) and VAR with Price (Model 3), as described in Table VI. All variables are standardized and winsorized by security, and are as defined in Table II. The sample is 
built as follows: we include all NYSE common stock of US-based firms (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) available in the CRSP and TAQ databases listed for at least 18 months 
over the interval January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008, and with no large changes (>10%) in the number of shares outstanding. The resulting sample includes 1,492 securities. 
Mean OFR is computed for all securities included in the sample for the period preceding the introduction of Rule 204T (January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008) and for a period 
following (January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010). Securities are ranked according to the proportional change in Mean OFR. Securities are then allocated to three quantiles – 
those with the highest decline in Mean OFR are allocated to the “High Proportion of Public Traders” sample, while those with the lowest decline in Mean OFR are allocated 
to the “Low Proportion of Public Traders” sample. Reported parameter estimates are averages of parameters estimated by security. Significance is tested employing a cross-
sectional estimate of the standard error of the parameter estimate, as in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000).  p-values from two-sided t-tests are in italics below the 
parameter estimates. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
Sample 
Response 
Δ PE 
Δ PE (incremental effect 
when lag PE > 0) 
Δ PE 
Volatility 
Δ Price Δ Volatility Δ Spread Δ OIB 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders 0.028 -0.125     -0.041 -0.009 -0.027 
338 Securities 0.24 0.34     <0.01 *** 0.45 0.04 ** 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders 0.054 -0.117     -0.073 -0.020 -0.063 
345 Securities 0.03 ** <0.01 ***     <0.01 *** 0.09 ** <0.01 *** 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders     -0.038   -0.045 -0.010 -0.027 
345 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.41 0.06 * 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders     -0.073   -0.079 -0.020 -0.063 
352 Securities     <0.01 ***   <0.01 *** 0.10 <0.01 *** 
A: Low Proportion of Public Traders       -0.001 -0.043 -0.011 -0.029 
345 Securities       0.79 <0.01 *** 0.32 0.07 * 
B: High Proportion of Public Traders       -0.003 -0.076 -0.022 -0.061 
352 Securities       0.19 <0.01 *** 0.07 * <0.01 *** 
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Table IX– Outstanding FTD Ratio (OFR) of Bear Stearns (Ticker: BSC) and of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Ticker: LEH) in 2008. 
 
OFR is computed as the ratio of our estimate of outstanding fails to deliver and shares outstanding. Index OFR is calculated as the equal weighted average of OFR of 
common stock of 4 firms that are matched on primary SIC and market capitalization as of the end of the fiscal year 2007 to BSC in Panel A and to LEH in Panel B. We 
construct a t-statistic using the mean and standard error of the OFR difference over the time interval January 1, 2008 to February 15, 2008 for BSC and over the time interval 
January 1, 2008 and ending 20 trading days prior to September 9, 2008 for LEH; p-values are two-sided. “*”, “**”, and “***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively.  
Panel A: Bear Stearns         Panel B: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
Date 
BSC 
Stock 
Price 
BSC 
OFR 
Index 
OFR 
Difference 
in OFR p-value   Date 
LEH 
Stock 
Price 
LEH 
OFR 
Index 
OFR 
Difference 
in OFR p-value 
3/3/2008 77.32 0.30% <0.01 0.30% 0.21     8/25/2008 13.45 0.31% <0.01 0.31% <0.01 *** 
3/4/2008 77.17 0.14% <0.01 0.14% <0.01 ***   8/26/2008 14.03 0.16% <0.01 0.16% <0.01 *** 
3/5/2008 75.78 0.14% 0.02% 0.12% <0.01 ***   8/27/2008 14.78 0.16% <0.01 0.16% <0.01 *** 
3/6/2008 69.9 0.24% 0.02% 0.22% <0.01 ***   8/28/2008 15.87 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
3/7/2008 70.08 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% <0.01 ***   8/29/2008 16.09 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
3/10/2008 62.3 0.12% 0.02% 0.10% <0.01 ***   9/2/2008 16.13 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
3/11/2008 62.97 0.28% <0.01 0.28% 0.16     9/3/2008 16.94 0.02% <0.01 0.02% <0.01 *** 
3/12/2008 61.58 1.16% 0.06% 1.10% <0.01 ***   9/4/2008 15.17 0.01% <0.01 0.01% <0.01 *** 
3/13/2008 57 1.06% 0.06% 1.00% <0.01 ***   9/5/2008 16.2 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% <0.01 *** 
3/14/2008 30 2.24% 0.08% 2.16% <0.01 ***   9/8/2008 14.15 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% <0.01 *** 
3/17/2008 4.81 12.18% 0.08% 12.10% <0.01 ***   9/9/2008 7.79 0.16% 0.03% 0.13% <0.01 *** 
3/18/2008 5.91 11.74% 0.04% 11.70% <0.01 ***   9/10/2008 7.25 0.85% 0.04% 0.81% <0.01 *** 
3/19/2008 5.33 11.74% 0.04% 11.70% <0.01 ***   9/11/2008 4.22 3.29% 0.04% 3.25% <0.01 *** 
3/20/2008 5.96 11.68% 0.08% 11.60% <0.01 ***   9/12/2008 3.65 4.86% 0.03% 4.83% <0.01 *** 
3/24/2008 11.25 12.26% 0.04% 12.22% <0.01 ***   9/15/2008 0.21 4.86% 0.05% 4.81% <0.01 *** 
3/25/2008 10.94 14.38% 0.08% 14.30% <0.01 ***   9/16/2008 0.3 5.21% 0.16% 5.05% <0.01 *** 
3/26/2008 11.21 10.92% 0.08% 10.84% <0.01 ***   9/17/2008 0.13 8.16% 0.18% 7.98% <0.01 *** 
3/27/2008 11.23 11.68% 0.06% 11.62% <0.01 ***   9/18/2008           
3/28/2008 10.78 12.36% 0.06% 12.30% <0.01 ***   9/19/2008     DELISTED     
3/29/2008 10.49 12.36% 0.06% 12.30% <0.01 ***   9/22/2008           
                9/23/2008           
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Figure 1 
 
 
Plots of accumulated impulse response functions depicting the impact of a one-standard deviation shock in OFR. 
The VAR model used for estimation is Model 2 and the sample is the ‘overall market’, as described in Table VI. 
The response variables in the four panels are, respectively, PE Volatility, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance, 
as defined in Table II. The horizontal axis are time periods (days), following the initial shock (day 0). All variables 
are standardized and winsorized by security. Impulse response coefficients are estimated by security; mean values 
are depicted. 5% confidence intervals are computed using cross-sectional standard error estimates. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
Plots of accumulated impulse response functions depicting the impact of a one-standard deviation shock in ODR. 
The VAR model used for estimation is Model 2 and the sample is the ‘overall market’, as described in Table VI. 
The response variables in the four panels are, respectively, PE Volatility, Volatility, Spread and Order Imbalance, 
as defined in Table II. The horizontal axis are time periods (days), following the initial shock (day 0). All variables 
are standardized and winsorized by security. Impulse response coefficients are estimated by security; mean values 
are depicted. 5% confidence intervals are computed using cross-sectional standard error estimates.  
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Figure 3 
Plot of Outstanding FTD Ratio and Return Index related to Bear Sterns Companies Inc. common stock (ticker: BSC) against calendar date. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 
1st of January, 2008; .  is the observed total return for BSC on day j, from the CRSP database.      
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Figure 4 
Plot of Outstanding FTD Ratio and Return Index related to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (ticker: LEH) over calendar time. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of 
January, 2008; .  is the observed total return for LEH on day j, from the CRSP database.    
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Figure 5 
Plot of Outstanding FTD Ratio and Return Index related to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (ticker: MER) over calendar 
time. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of January, 2008; .  is the 
observed total return for MER on day j, from the CRSP database.   
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Plot of Outstanding FTD Ratio and Return Index related to American International Group (ticker: AIG) over 
calendartime. The Return Index is set to 1 on the 1st of January, 2008; .  
is the observed total return for AIG on day j, from the CRSP database. 
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